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Theo A. F. Kuipers
KINDS OF MICRO-EXPLANATION 
REPLY TO ERIK WEBER AND HELENA DE PREESTER 
The paper by Erik Weber and Helena De Preester is in at least two respects 
very stimulating. First, it nicely illustrates how my five-steps model of 
explanation can be adapted to what I would like to call structural explanations 
of system laws. Second, it provides a clear sight of a (compatible) kind of 
functional explanation of such laws that is not touched upon in SiS. 
Structural Explanation of System Laws 
The explanation elaborated by Weber and De Preester in Section 2 for a circuit 
law on the basis of my five-steps model of explanation (SiS, Ch. 3) is an 
excellent and totally unexpected kind of use of that model. More specifically, 
they convincingly show that an input-output law (L) characterizing the 
observable behavior of the circuit can be deduced from three “fundamental 
(individual) laws,” two “interaction principles” and five “bridge principles.” 
The deduction comprises an aggregation (A) step, followed by a 
transformation (T) step, hence their speaking of an AT explanation. I have 
nothing to add to this lucid analysis, just some additional remarks that may 
further exploit the example.
(1) The aggregation step is a nice example of what was intended with the 
second (italicized below) half of my elucidation (SiS, p. 87): “the total effect 
of the individual law for many objects is calculated by a suitable addition, or
composition (or synthesis) if more than one type of individual law is involved,”
since the three individual laws, characterizing the gates, concern two types: 
AND and XOR gates. Moreover, only in the case of uniformly sequential or 
parallel grouping of a number of gates of the same type would it be adequate 
to speak of (straightforward) aggregation.
(2) As a matter of fact, the authors show that the five-steps model, which 
was primarily intended for the explanation of a law by a theory (indicated in 
Weber and De Preester’s Section 5.2), can easily be adapted to a model for the 
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explanation of a “system law” starting with, instead of a “(theory-) application 
step,” an “observation step,” as I would like to call it, for it amounts to the 
establishment of observational laws regarding components of the system. 
Their fundamental laws amount essentially to thus established laws for the 
gates in the circuit.
(3) The interaction and bridge principles are essentially identity claims. 
The first ones claim that certain gate outputs are identical to certain gate 
inputs. The bridge (or transformation) principles claim that certain gate inputs 
and outputs are identical to certain circuit inputs and outputs, respectively.
(4) The fundamental laws (or individual gate laws) and the bridge 
principles (gate identities) constitute together the internal or micro-principles 
used by the micro-explanation.
(5) The resulting explanation may not only be called a case of micro-
reduction due to the (complex) aggregation step, but also a case of 
identificatory reduction, due to the identity nature of all transformation 
principles. Hence, apart from the different nature of the (hidden) first step, the 
example is essentially similar to the reduction of the ideal gas law.
(6) It seems plausible to call the present type of explanation of circuit laws 
and, more generally, system laws, structural (reductive) explanations, in 
particular when they are opposed to what Weber and De Preester call 
functional explanations of such laws, to be discussed now. 
Functional Explanation of System Laws 
Inspired by Cummins (1975), Weber and De Preester also give a kind of 
functional explanation of the same system law, viz. an explanation in terms of 
function ascriptions to the three gates in the circuit and the assumption that 
these gates function normally. Again I would just like to make a couple of 
remarks.
(1) Talking about functions should not hide the fact that the normal 
functioning of a gate can be described by hybrid behavioral laws, e.g. Fa and 
Na together imply the law (NFa): “output2(C) = 1 iff input3(C) = 1 and 
output(b) = 1,” and the resulting three laws together imply the system law to 
be explained.
(2) Such hybrid laws can easily be redescribed as bridge principles, from 
gates to the system or vice versa. For example, NFa is equivalent to “if 
output(b) = 1, then output2(C) = 1 iff input3(C) = 1, and if output(b) = 0, then 
output2(C) = 0.” Hence, the resulting explanation fits into the five-steps model 
in the sense that these laws are in fact transformation principles of the causal 
correlation type such that the explanation amounts to a number of correlation 
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steps, with the peculiar fact that they do not start from individual laws of a 
substantial nature but of a (context-relative) tautological nature, such as 
“output(b) = 1 or output (b) = 0.” In view of the fact that neither Weber and 
De Preester’s version nor the indicated nonfunctional version use individual 
laws, let alone micro-principles giving rise to such laws, it seems less 
appropriate to talk in this case about micro-explanations, as Weber and De 
Preester in fact do.
(3) The foregoing remarks are not intended to play down the practical 
usefulness of normal function talk. As in the case of biological functions, 
following Ruth Millikan (see SiS, Sections 4.2 and 6.2), if adapted, function 
talk makes also perfect sense in the case of artificial functions. As a matter of 
fact, whereas ascriptions of biological functions are essentially based on at 
least two causal components, one of a proximate and one of an ultimate nature, 
artificial function ascriptions may be based on merely one type of causal laws, 
as NFa illustrates. Weber and De Preester’s contribution strongly suggests that 
a further general analysis of functional explanations related to artificial 
systems along the lines of “explanation by specification” as developed in 
Chapter 4 of SiS would be very interesting.
(4) Very illuminating is the “multiple realizability” that Weber and De 
Preester discuss in Section 4. The same functions that are played by the gates 
can be realized in other ways than the particular “material realizations” in the 
sample circuit. I would like to add that the reductive explanation of the circuit 
law in Section 2 provides a perfect “artificial” illustration of the compatibility 
of multiple realizability and reductive explanations. As suggested in SiS (e.g. 
pp. 154-5) with some examples from natural science, the popular claim in 
functionalist philosophy of mind by Fodor and Putnam that multiple 
realizability is a blockade for reduction, is due to a lack of understanding of 
successful reductive arguments in the natural sciences.
(5) Finally, Weber and De Preester go as far as to claim that a functional 
explanation of the circuit law is not theoretically interesting and only 
practically useful, i.e. useful for manipulation of the circuit and, I would like to 
add, diagnostic reasoning about it, if the relevant structural explanation is 
available as well. This agrees with my claim (SiS, p. 126): “Explanation by a 
certain type of specification [intentional, functional, causal] automatically 
leads to a corresponding type of description, in particular classification.” In 
other words, (isolated) functional explanations are in a sense merely a kind of 
description. However, as indicated in the contribution of Grobler and 
WiĞniewski and my reply to them, in special cases, they may play an important 
role in the evaluation of theories. 
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